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5  Perfect experiential constructions: 
the inferential semantics of direct evidence
Man kann viel sehn, wenn man zwei Augen hat und nicht blind ist und die Sonn scheint. 
 —Marie
5.1 Introduction
In his typological categorization of evidential systems, Thomas Willett observes 
that “the primary evidential parameter expressed in natural language is that of 
direct evidence versus indirect evidence” (1988: 57 emphasis in original); he 
sees evidence from the senses as a sub-type of ‘direct’ and ‘inferring’ as one sub-
type of ‘indirect’ (1988: 57). In a more recent typological categorization, Alexandra 
Aikhenvald divides the world’s evidential categories into six “recurrent semantic 
parameters” (2004: 63), viz. visual, sensory, inference, assumption, hearsay and 
quotative (2004: 65); although “a number of these six parameters can be subsu-
med under one evidential specification” (2004: 64), she does not observe crossover 
between the visual and inferential. In a similar vein, Scott DeLancey holds that 
“direct vs. indirect evidence is the fundamental evidential distinction” (2012: 540), 
and Hengeveld and Olbertz assert that “a case of direct perception” and “a case 
of inference on the basis of perception” are “two completely different cases when 
seen from the evidential perspective” (2012: 495). Agreement with the dominant 
perspective that starkly separates sensory evidence from inference is not univer-
sal. Tournadre remarks that “l’inférentiel est un type de « testimonial » particulier, 
puisqu’il implique une opération construite à partir d’une constatation (d’indices, 
de traces, etc)” (1994: 158 emphasis in original). Similarly, de Haan classifies 
inference along with sense evidence as a sub-type of direct evidence (2001: 195). 
According to his semantic analysis the “inferential evidential has certain elements 
in common with […] sensory evidentials (such as visual evidentiality)” (2001: 193).
To the extent that any inference pertains to the world outside, for biological 
reasons this inference will originate with a sense perception. One must presume that 
the authors who see no overlap between perception and inference do not espouse 
Note: I would like to thank the British Academy and the European Research Council for support 
during the course of this research. Abbreviations appear at the end of this chapter. In Tibetan, 
any noun phrase not specified for case should be construed as absolutive.
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an analysis that totally precludes the use of sense perceptions in the drawing of 
inferences, but rather they draw an empirical generalization on the basis of the 
distribution of language specific structural morphosyntactic categories. A possible 
paraphrase of this perspective is that all languages with grammaticalized eviden-
tials fail to employ the evidential category used for (non-inferential) direct percep-
tion in inference contexts. This essay assumes such a paraphrase is a fair reflection 
of a view Willett, Aikhenvald, DeLancey, and Hengevel and Obertz share.
A number of previously published descriptions of languages, showing inter-
actions between direct evidence and inference appeared prior to Willett (1988). 
Rule (1977: 71–75) describes an evidential category of ‘visual evidence’ in Foe that 
is distinct from both ‘seen’ and ‘deduced’; this category exactly strides Willett’s 
unbreachable chasm. Willett appears unaware of Rule (1977), but Aikhenvald 
accommodates the Foe system, putting the ‘seen’, ‘visual evidence’ and ‘deduced’ 
respectively into her ‘visual’, ‘inference’ and ‘assumptive’ parameters (2004: 63). 
Gordon (1986: 76, Note 4) notes in Maricopa the use of a lexical verb yuu ‘see’ in 
inference contexts. Although both Willett (1988: 68) and Aikhenvald (2004: 275) 
cite Gordon’s work, they appear to have overlooked the relevant footnote and its 
importance. Watahomigie et al. (1982: 395) report an evidential system in Hualapai, 
which systematically collapses inference and direct evidence in certain contexts. 
Willett and Aikhenvald take no notice of the Hualapai system.1 The perfect expe-
riential construction found in Sherpa, Duna, Oksapmin, Bogaia, and ‘Lhasa’ 
Tibetan, in which the conjunction of sensory evidence and perfect tense2 gives rise 
to the semantics of inference, provides further counter-evidence to the dominant 
perspective.3 Cognizance of the perfect experiential construction in these five 
languages permits its recognition also in Kham and Kashaya.
1 In another case of interaction between direct evidentiality and inference, Matses has a binary evi-
dential opposition between conjecture and non-conjecture, in which direct experience and infer-
ence constitute the two sub-specfications of non-conjecture. Relying on Aikhenvald (2004), Fleck 
distinguishes three evidential categories: experiential (-o, -onda, -denne), inferential (-ak, -nëdak, 
-ampik, -nëdampik) and conjecture (-așh and -nëdașh) (2007: 593), but his own description of the 
co-occurence constraints of these suffixes belies this analysis. Whereas the “conjecture suffixes, 
-așh and -nëdașh, cannot combine with any of the other evidential inflections” (2007: 602) “one 
of the experiential suffixes (-o, -onda, or -denne) must be used directly after the inferential suffix” 
(2007: 599). So, Matses has two evidential categories (conjecture and non-conjecture), of which 
conjecture is mono-morphemic, whereas non-conjecture is bi-morphemic, the first morpheme 
specifying time from event to detection and the second morpheme specifying time from detection 
to report. Thus, inferential and experiential belong to the same evidential specification.
2 Through this essay I use ‘tense’ as equivalent to Greek chrónos or Latin tempus, i.e. I do not 
intend ‘tense’ as opposed to ‘aspect’. 
3 Willett (1988) and Aikhenvald (2004) cite the article of Woodbury (1986) on Sherpa, but with-
out realizing that his description vitiates their overall typologies.
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The goal of this essay is emphatically not to demonstrate that ‘perfect experi-
ential’ is a novel typological category, rather its modest aim is to correct a common 
misunderstanding of the relationship between inference and direct evidence 
present in the works of others. Because the goal is negative the ontological status 
of ‘inference’ and ‘direct evidence’ as categories in the conception of previous 
researchers is immaterial. As Nāgārjuna argued long ago, to show that the view of 
another is inconsistent, whether internally inconsistent or contradicted by obser-
vation, it is unnecessary to commit to the validity of the terms of the debate, but 
suffices to manipulate these terms in a way analogous to the interlocutor. Lest the 
promotion of the ‘perfect experiential’ as a productive conceptualization of these 
language specific phenomena take on the air of a newly discovered platonic form, 
a general adumbration of the tasks and limits of linguistic typology within the 
context of recent methodological discussions precedes discussion of the propo-
sed application of the term ‘perfect experiential’ in particular languages.
5.1.1 Terminological and theoretical preliminaries
Linguistic typology faces the hurdle of employing cross-linguistic terminology 
to compare the grammatical categories of individual languages as definable in 
sui generis structural terms. Broadly speaking there are two current approaches 
to this challenge. One school posits pre-established universal grammatical cate-
gories that particular languages instantiate (Dixon 2010; Newmeyer 2007, 2010). 
Researchers operating in this tradition refrain from making explicit the ontologi-
cal status of these categories or the epistemological means of accessing them. The 
alternative school accepts the structuralist position that “all linguistic categories 
are language specific” (Lazard 2012: 249) and makes cross linguistic comparisons 
on the basis of ‘intuitive conceptual frameworks’ (Lazard 2012: 250) or ‘compara-
tive concepts’ (Haspelmath 2010a). Newmeyer is critical of this latter approach, 
noting that Haspelmath employs thematic roles among his comparative con-
cepts, and that “there is no construct as murky in any subdivision of linguistic 
theory as that of ‘thematic role’” (2010: 689 emphasis in original).4 Haspelmath 
offers the pragmatic but unpersuasive reply that “problems with such semantic 
4 Newmeyer cites Dowty’s observation that thematic roles are also beset with onotological and 
epistemological problems, namely “(i) lack of agreement among linguists as to which thematic 
roles exist, and (ii) the lack of any effective way to independently justify the assignment of noun 
phrases to thematic roles in particular sentences” (Dowty 1989: 70). Rather than dismissing the-
matic roles in a spasm of aporia, as this quote might imply he does, Dowty instead proposes an 
account of thematic roles using model theoretic semantics.
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roles have never arisen in a typological context” and typology “is happy to limit 
its generalizations to clear cases of agents, patients, and recipients” (2010b: 697). 
Haspelmath does not specify how we can know whether a particular case of an 
agent, patient, etc. is clear. If roles are messy and contested but no typologists 
complain, this speaks more to the phlegmatic disposition of typologists than it 
does to the suitability of semantic roles as methodological tools. 
An appeal to semantics implies the need for a semantic theory; Newmeyer points 
to the dozens of incommensurate semantic theories in circulation as evidence of the 
uphill battle facing Haspelmath’s comparative concepts (2007: 139). The problem 
is worse than Newmeyer presents—although semantics thrives as a sub-discipline 
of linguistics, Bloomfield’s objection that “the study of language can be conducted 
without special assumptions only so long as we pay no attention to the meaning of 
what is spoken” (1933: 75 and 139–157) remains unanswered. If, as Bloomfield sug-
gests, semantics is itself an impossibility, then Haspelmath’s comparative concepts 
are doomed to remain loose, vague, and indeterminate. The typologist has no means 
by which to understand his own most effective tools. It is as if a chemist, having 
added a droplet to a beaker of liquid, observes the liquid turn red, and confidently 
declares the droplet to contain acid, despite readily admitting that he does not know 
(even cannot know) the composition of the liquid, let alone why it changes red. 
But language is not a chemical. Linguists lack labs or machines to determine 
the presence or non presence of a particular purported meaning; in the words 
of Haspelmath “pre-established categories don’t exist” (2007). Language, as a 
social institution (Sapir 1921: 2), presents methodological hurdles analogous to 
other cultural practices studied in a cross-cultural perspective. Consequently, 
Haspelmath’s comparative concepts draw inspiration from the comparative study 
of wedding dress and legal systems (2010a: 681).5 In 2003–2004 Harvard’s Tozzier 
Library hosted an exhibition of footwear across cultures and ages. The visitor 
who hoped to behold shoeicity itself left disappointed, but his naïveté and no 
curatorial failing engendered his disappointment. 
When a linguist chooses a semantic label for a morphosyntactic phenomenon, 
he does this on analogy to the use of that label in the description of other languages. 
5 In reply to this point, Newmeyer cites a comment of Greenberg’s that because “language as a 
subject matter possesses certain peculiarities such as the arbitrariness of the relation between 
form and meaning” (1973: 59) the use of linguistic methodology in other disciplines have been un-
successful. This reply misses the point. Haspelmath does not encourage anthropologists to  use 
the methods of linguistics, but he encourages linguistics to use the methods of anthropologists. 
Newmeyer’s observation that attempts at applying the comparative method to social institutions 
such as mythology, religion, and law “all resulted in failure” (2010: 693), reveals ignorance of recent 
research in historical linguistics and comparative mythology (e.g. Watkins 1995 and Witzel 2012).
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If a student working on a far-flung language finds a grammatical phenomenon he is 
unsure how to describe, he rummages through the linguistic literature for analogues 
to serve as inspiration. This groping for labels results in terminological choices that 
in hindsight may seem unfortunate. For example, in Classical Tibetan ‘terminative’ 
refers to a case with the allomorphs -tu, -du, -r, and -su that is used for destinations 
of movement or transformations, equivalent to ‘to’, ‘into’ or ‘as’ in English (Hill 2011: 
19–35), but cases known as ‘terminative’ in other languages such as Basque -ra-ino 
or Hungarian -ig instead correspond in meaning to English ‘up to’ or ‘until’ (Creissels 
2008: 610, 619). Since the relationship between signifiant and signifié is arbitrary no 
harm need arise from such situations. The use of the term ‘aorist’ to describe verbal 
forms of very different meaning in Greek and Tuareg poses no danger either to the 
classicist who knows that ḗlthon ‘went’ is an aorist or to the Berberist who knows 
that əq̀qəl ‘will return’ is an aorist (Belkadi 2013: 137). On the other hand, the typolo-
gist lives in ubiquitous and constant danger of presuming that ḗlthon and əq̀qəl are 
incarnations of a ‘true aorist’.6 There is no grammatical category in any language 
that refers to the same concept as the grammatical category of another language for 
the simple reason that the two categories will face differing structural oppositions; 
to speak of a ‘true evidential’ (DeLancey 2001: 376), ‘true mirative’ (DeLancey 2012: 
553), or ‘true egophoricity’ (DeLancey 2012: 555), etc. is always a mistake.
To have any concrete meaning the chain of analogies a typological term gestu-
res to must be moored to a particular phenomenon in a particular language. To say 
of ni and kyaṅ in Classical Tibetan that they are similar in function to wa and mo in 
Japanese is more succinct, accurate, and verifiable than to say that ni is a ‘subject 
particle’ (Miller 1970: 90), ‘Isolationspartikel’ (Hahn 1996: 63), ‘topicalizer’ (Beyer 
1992: 275), or whatever. The typologist should serve as matchmaker in such a case 
between the Tibetologist and the Japanologist. By aggregating observations on 
phenomena in diverse languages the typologist lowers the transaction cost for an 
investigator looking at a tidbit in one language to find a tidbit in another that he 
might find interesting. For typology to provide a milieu to assist those confronting 
the analysis of a specific language in understanding what they witness with greater 
insight, that is goal enough. For this purpose he assembles a menagerie, a cabinet 
of curiosities that may be more or less skillfully curated. The temptation remains 
imminent to slip from describing ni to describing subjecthood, topicality, or wha-
tever, but subjecthood and topicality are not things in the world; ni and wa are. 
6 The danger is mitigated in cases such as ‘aorist’ where the non-equivalence of the meaning is 
obvious. The temptation to believe that the ergative in Tibetan and Basque are ‘the same thing’ is 
much greater, and consequently more dangerous, than the temptation to think that the ‘termina-
tive’ in these two languages is ‘the same thing’. 
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The more in focus remain the realia underpinning the analogies implicit in the 
use of a semantic label for a morpho-syntactic phenomenon, the more explicit 
and rigorous typology becomes and the more helpful this discipline renders itself 
to students of the world’s languages. I accept Haspelmath’s methodology and 
undertake to employ it, while bearing in mind that comparative concepts are not 
linguistic entities and their elaboration is not a contribution to linguistics; they are 
manners of speaking, convenient fictions, conceits, precise only if reducible to the 
pair-wise comparison of bits of the grammars of specific languages.
With this methodological orientation in place the account of the ‘perfect 
experiential’ construction begins. The label ‘perfect experiential’ is built on the 
model of such terms in traditional grammar as ‘perfect subjunctive’ and ‘aorist 
imperative’. No terminological choice precludes misunderstanding, but traditio-
nal terms of this type have the benefit of implying the conjunction of two catego-
ries (for example aorist and imperative) that are both members of superordinate 
categories (tense and mood), with both subordinate and superordinate catego-
ries well defined using language internal distributional criteria. Furthermore, alt-
hough the literature is not innocent of meditations on aoristicity (Culioli 1980), 
traditional terms present themselves more clearly as arbitrary labels than their 
younger kin (ergative, anti-passive, etc.). The ‘perfect experiential’ takes as its 
paragon the suffix -bźag in ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan. 
5.1.2 The perfect, direct perception, and inference
Comrie, who defines the perfect as encoding “the continuing present relevance of 
a past situation” (1976: 53), notes a correlation between the perfect and inferenti-
als. In Bulgarian, Georgian, and Estonian “the Inferential form for the Past Tense 
consists of a Past Participle plus the Present Tense of the verb ‘to be’, i.e. a form 
[…] characteristic of the perfect” (1976: 110). He explains that with
the perfect, a past event is related to a present state, in other words the past event is not 
simply presented per se, but because of its relation to a present state. With the inferential, 
the past event is again not presented simply per se, rather it is inferred from some less direct 
result of the action (e.g. a second-hand report, or prima facie evidence, such as the wetness 
of the road leading to the inference that it has been raining, even when the raining itself has 
not been directly witnessed). Thus the semantic similarity (not, of course, identity) between 
perfect and inferential lies in the fact that both categories present an event not in itself, but 
via its results. (1976: 110)
In Comrie’s example of witnessing wetness on the road the source of evidence is 
visual and the tense is perfect. In such a case, inference is the direct summation 
of the semantics of direct evidence and the semantics of the perfect. 
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Even in English sensory evidence when combined with perfect tense can 
yield inferential semantics. On entering the living room the night before Easter 
a parent, who sees torn bits of chocolate wrappers and chocolatey paw prints 
across the carpet, might say: 
(1) I see the dog has found the Easter chocolates.
The use of the verb ‘see’ in example (1) ensures that this construction encodes 
visual evidence, and yet, the proposition ‘the dog found the Easter chocolates’ is 
an inference.7 English is not a language with paradigmatic obligatory encoding 
of information source. Nonetheless, English is relevant because it shows that in 
principle inferential readings are latent in the semantics of seeing. One “cannot 
deny the fact that sentences like I see that you are a liar contain a direct indication 
to the speaker’s source of evidence, i.e. the senses” (Usoniene 1999: 217).
Visser’s general observation that “evidential meanings seem to be in line with 
the meaning of the tenses they are fused with, obeying the rules of logic” (2015: 308) 
applies without any obstacle to the interaction of direct witness and perfect. In the 
Duna perfect experiential, inferential semantics are “completely predictable given 
the usual meaning of the individual forms” (San Roque 2008: 379). Volkart (2000) 
spells out this predictability with reference to the perfect experiential in Tibetan.
Now if you say ‘I can see it’ with reference to something which is still in progress [...], this 
means that what you see is the process or event itself. If, on the other hand, you say ‘I can 
see it’ with reference to something that has been completed in the past […], this means that 
the event must have some effect or result in the present time, since the notion of ‘seeing it’ 
can only refer to present results, but not to an action already completed. (2000: 143)
If one sees ‘that something has happened,’ one sees evidence in the present that 
the action took place in the past, and that the state of the world produced by the 
action continues into the moment of observation, i.e. one infers that the event 
took place in the past on the basis of evidence in the present. 
7 The inferential reading of the verb ‘see’ with a subordinate clause in the perfect is not obliga-
tory. The host of a party might say to a guest upon arrival: “I see that you’ve brought your Belgian 
boyfriend along” (BNC), with the boyfriend in full view. The present progressive is also compat-
ible with both inferential and direct readings. In a sentence such as “I see you’re weaving a rug” 
the ‘direct evidence’ reading is triggered in a situation such as this: a student fails to arrive at a 
meeting. Another student locates him in the weaving studio, saying with a tone of indignation, 
‘We expected you to be at the meeting in room three, but I see you are weaving a rug’. For the 
inferential reading both guest and host are in a living room. The guest sees a loom in the corner, 
approaches it, and says to his host ‘I see you’re weaving a rug’.
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It is misplaced to object that inference is a cognitive operation relating premi-
ses and conclusion, pointing to the process of reasoning to arrive at a conclusion, 
whereas ‘direct perception’ does not point to the speaker’s reasoning process but 
directly to the evidence. On the one hand, since all experience is mediated by the 
sense organs, perception of an object as a Gestalt is always ‘inferred’. On the other 
hand, when Arthur Eddington watched the solar eclipse of 29 May 1919 from the 
island of Príncipe, he directly perceived the correctness of Einstein’s general 
theory of relativity. Tournadre and LaPolla emphasize the arbitrary nature of the 
distinction between ‘direct evidence’ and ‘inference’ by drawing attention to four 
scenarios which showcase the ambiguity. 
a.  If we see smoke over a forest and say: ‘There is a fire’, is it sensory visual (and/or olfactory) 
or is it inferential based on seeing smoke (visual)? What we see is actually the smoke 
not the fire.
b.  If we look at a map and say: ‘Melbourne is near Sydney’, we might use a visual evidential 
looking at the map, but the map is not the reality. You need inference and the knowledge 
of the scale to draw conclusions concerning the distance.
c.  If we hear a sound on the roof and say ‘It is raining’, is it direct evidence or an inference 
based on the type of sound made by the rain drops?
d.  When the speaker sees somebody moving in a particular way and says: ‘He is 
coming’, it is also an inference based on the perception that the general direction 
of movement is toward the speaker. It can also be a confirmation that the person is 
actually coming, that is, the speaker knew somebody was to come and on seeing the 
person says the utterance as a confirmation, which could involve a different form of 
evidential marking. (2014: 258)
If a researcher decides a priori which scenarios constitute direct perception and 
which constitute inference, he studies only his own opinions. Instead, a semantic 
analysis should emerge empirically from the use in natural language of an identi-
fiable morpho-syntactic category. Such an investigation makes clear the intimate 
contacts both between perfects and inferentials and between sensory evidentials 
and inferentials.
5.2  Previously noted perfect experiential constructions
The use of sensory evidentials for inferential semantics in specific tense 
and aspect constructions is attested in Sherpa, Duna, Oksapmin, Bogaia, 
and ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan. Because the description of the relevant phenomena in 
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Sherpa (a Tibetan dialect), and Duna, Oksapmin, and Bogaia (three languages 
of Papua New Guinea) has yet to garner controversy, it suffices here to sum-
marize the findings of previous researchers. In contrast, although the majority 
of scholars describe -bźag as a perfect experiential in ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan, others 
see it as exhibiting a dedicated ‘inferential’ evidential category. The investiga-
tion here concurs with the majority of investigators. 
5.2.1 Sherpa
Woodbury (1986) points out that the Sherpa form nok is used as a visual sensory 
evidential in the present tense (glossing with ‘I see, have seen…’) and an inferen-
tial evidential in the past (glossing with ‘I hear, I infer…’)
(2) ḍaa saa-p mi ti yembur-laa de-ki-nok
rice eat-nmlz man he Kathmandu-dat stay-he
‘The man who is eating rice lives in Kathmandu.’ (I see, … have seen)
(Woodbury 1986: 191)
(3) ʹjon-ki ʹti ʹkuršiŋq ʹti dzo-nok
John-ERG the chair it build-PI
‘John built the chair.’ (I infer ... I hear ... )
(Woodbury 1986: 93)
He attributes these two uses of nok to it being used for ‘immediate evidence’, 
either evidence of the event itself taking place in the present, or the evidence of 
the aftermath of an event that allows the speaker to make an inferential claim. 
Kelly (2004: 251/252) notes that nok can be used either as a visual sensory evi-
dential in imperfective contexts and an inferential perfective contexts. Tournadre 
et al. classify -no’ as sensory in all tenses (see Tab. 1). To them the inferential 
meaning of sensory evidentials in the perfect tense is apparently self explanatory. 
Tab. 1: Sherpa tense and evidential affixes according to Tournadre et al. (2009: 271/272).
Present (general) Present (progressive) Past (simple) Perfect Future
Egophoric
Factual
Sensory
giwiʹ
uza
ginoʹ
inweʹ
inweza
innoʹ
win
uza
sung
niweʹ
niweza
noʹ
in/up
uza
--- 
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5.2.2 Duna
The Duna suffix -rua furnishes the next example of the perfect experiential 
construction. In Duna “the visual evidential -rua is used as a primary inflec-
tion in reference to states that are assumed to be ongoing at the time of utte-
rance” (San Roque 2008: 380). When it is attached to the -a base of verbs 
with a stative meaning this suffix “marks states that the perceiver observed 
to be the case before the time of utterance” (San Roque 2008: 317, cf. example 
(4)). The -a base is broadly associated with imperfective aspect (San Roque 
2008: 275). 
(4) phekeriti-tia, [...] khao rindi-ta ra-rua
factory.lw-pl redskin ground-loc be/put-stat.vis.p
‘Factories, [...] they exist in European places {I saw}.’
(San Roque 2008: 317)
However, when applied to the -o base (associated with perfective aspect) of action 
verbs “the verb is independently specified as perfective with respect to ‘now’, and 
-rua is added to give extra information about how the speaker knows that this 
event took place; they have seen something that suggests it” (San Roque 2008: 
379). In other words, in this construction an action occurred in the past with 
results that carry forward until the time of the utterance, a typical perfect scena-
rio. To be clear, the -o stem is perfective in opposition to the imperfective -a stem; 
it is the combination of the -o stem with -rua that yields a perfect-like construc-
tion. The speaker witnesses not the event itself, but merely its result (examples 
(5) and (6)). 
(5) rowa hundi ro-rua
fire disappear be.pfv-stat.vis.p
‘The fire had gone out {I saw}.’
(San Roque 2008: 380)
(6) anda-ta hoa-ya-roko, Metai yeria aye-ya ngo-rua.
house-loc come-dep-sw.sim psn chestnut gather-dep go.pfv-stat.vis.p
‘[I] was coming to the house, Metai had gone to gather chestnuts {I saw}.’
(San Roque 2008: 380)
The use of the English pluperfect in the translations of examples (5) and (6) 
makes clear that the action took place first, the speaker witnessed the resulting 
state later, and later still (at the time of speaking) the speaker reports the action 
to a listener, employing a visual evidential. With this construction Duna presents 
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a perfect experiential, the intersection of visual evidence and the perfect yielding 
the semantics of inference.
5.2.3 Oksapmin
To express inference Oksapmin uses the verb x- ‘to be’ in an auxiliary construc-
tion marked for visual evidence and perfective aspect in one of the three past 
tenses (far past, yesterday past, today past); the subordinate verb is marked in the 
personal evidential category (Loughnane 2009: 428–430).8 Examples (7) and (8) 
demonstrate this construction.
(7) mlo-s=a ej [ku muk ixil sik ap 
come.up-seq=link gosh woman group 3p sick(Eng) house 
m-tpul=a         xu-ja]                 x-n-gwel 
prx.o-close(.seq)=link   go.pfv-per.todp.pl   be-pfv-vis.yestp
‘I came up and saw that the ladies had already shut the health centre and gone.’
(Loughnane 2009: 428)
(8) wanxe=si wanxe=si=a awat x-t-ja 
a.lot=with a.lot=with=emph decorate.self DO-pfv-per.todp.pl 
x-n-gopa=li=o 
be-pfv-vis.fp.pl=rep=emph
‘(It was seen that) lots and lots (of people) had decorated themselves.’
(Loughnane 2009: 428)
The use of the English pluperfect in the translations of examples (7) and (8) 
makes clear that the action took place first, the speaker witnessed the resulting 
state later, and later still (at the time of speaking) the speaker reports the action 
to a listener, employing a visual evidential.
Without the auxiliary x- ‘be’ the past perfective visual implies that the speaker 
was a direct witness to the event, as seen in examples (9) and (10). 
(9) a go apuŋ=xe i=xi-m əpli-n-gwel 
HES 2s yesterday=foc like.that=DO-seq come-pfv-vis.yestp 
‘Hey, (I saw that) you came like this too yesterday.’
(Loughnane 2009: 257)
8 ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan also neutralizes in favor of the personal in subordinate clauses (cf. Chang and 
Chang 1984: 607–608; DeLancey 1990: 298).
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(10) de=nuŋ s-pti=o n-p-n-gwe 
which=TO go-ipfv.pl(.prs)=quot 1/2.O-tell-pfv-vis.todp.pl 
‘(I saw that) they told us “where are you going?”’
(Loughnane 2009: 285)
Although the Oksapmin auxiliary construction with x- is structurally qute distinct 
in its formation from the use in Duna of -rua with base -o verbs, both construc-
tions intersect explicitly morphological marking of sensory evidence and explicit 
morphological marking of perfective aspect to yield inferential meaning.
5.2.4 Bogaia
San Roque and Loughnane draw attention to the possibility of an inferential 
interpretation of the visual evidence marker -ki in Bogaia when used with past 
tense verbs (2012: 128, 156). 
(11) ho mabaro wagan mogona=ki
[3sg pig hunt go.pst=vis]
‘He has gone to hunt pigs. (I saw him go.)’, or ‘I see evidence that he went.’
(San Roque and Loughnane 2012: 128, citing Seeland 2007: 9 and Seeland, 
personal communication)
Although San Roque and Loughnane (2012: 128) describe the verb form as ‘past’ 
they offer an English translation in the present perfect. In this case again perfect 
aspect and visual evidence, the perfect experiential, may give rise to an inferential 
interpretation, although this interpretation is not obligatory. Thus, Bogaia confirms 
that semantic inference can be grammatically expressed with a visual evidential. 
5.2.5 ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan
The suffix bźag in ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan provides a fifth example of a direct eviden-
tial marker used for inferential semantics.9 Table 2 presents an overview of the 
9 Ideally one should draw a distinction among the language of the city of Lhasa itself, other dia-
lects of Central Tibet, and the lingua franca of the Tibetan diaspora (Miller 1955; Róna-Tas 1985: 
160–161). However, because previous authors do not clearly maintain these distinctions, it is not 
possible to do so here. In order to keep the ambiguity of the underlying language in focus I write 
‘Lhasa’ with single quotes.
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‘Lhasa’ Tibetan verbal system and the place of bźag in this system.10 The conclu-
sion that the use of V-bźag in ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan undermines the preconception that 
inference and sense evidence require encoding with separate categories rests on 
the analysis of V-bźag as a perfect experiential (cf. Yukawa 1971: 190 inter alios). 
In contrast, DeLancey (1985: 65–67, 2003: 279) and Tournadre and Dorje (2009: 
140–144, 410, 413) propose that bźag marks a separate ‘inferential’ category. For 
the analysis of V-bźag in ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan as a perfect experiential to stand secure, 
these alternative analyses call for reply.
5.2.5.1 DeLancey’s analysis of Tibetan V-bźag
DeLancey’s opinion that “in a true evidential language” direct perception and 
inference “could not be in the same grammatical form” (2012: 536), is compatible 
with his own analysis of the ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan verb. In 1985, when writing about the 
meaning of V-bźag, DeLancey contrasts this morpheme with V-pa-red, and V-soṅ, 
citing examples (12), (13), and (14).
(12) bsod-nams-kyis thaṅ-kha bkal-pa-red
Sonam-erg Thangka hang-pst:fac
‘Sonam hung up a Thangka’ (based on report or inference)
(DeLancey 1985: 65)
10 The analysis in Tab. 2 reflects my own understanding of the Tibetan verbal system. In non-
finite clauses the difference among the three evidential moods is often neutralized in favor of 
the personal (cf. note 8). This paper will not discuss the constructions V-byuṅ, V-myoṅ, V-yoṅ, 
V-pa-ḥdug, etc. which, although essential parts of a complete picture of the ‘Lhasa’ verb, are not 
relevant to the current discussion. 
Tab. 2: ‛Lhasa’ Tibetan copula systm (top) and verbal conjugation (bottom).
Existential 
copula
Equational 
copula
Personal yod yin
Factual yod-pa-red red
Experiential ḥdug red-bźag
Future Present Past Perfect
Personal V-gi-yin V-gi-yod V-pa-yin V-yod
Factual V-gi-red V-gi-yod-pa-red V-pa-red V-yod-pa-red
Experiential  --- V-gi-ḥdug V-soṅ V-bźag
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(13) bsod-nams-kyis thaṅ-kha bkal-soṅ
Sonam-erg Thangka hang-pst:exp
‘Sonam hung up a Thangka’ (based on direct perception)
(DeLancey 1985: 65)
(14) bsod-nams-kyis thaṅ-kha bkal-bźag
Sonam-erg Thangka hang-prf:exp
‘Sonam hung up a Thangka’ (inferred from direct perception of the hanging 
Thangka)
(DeLancey 1985: 66)
Discussing the difference between the meaning of V-bźag and V-soṅ DeLancey 
refers to 
the inadequacy of a simple notion of direct evidence here, for there are clearly two 
distinct types of direct perception which can be distinguished: direct perception of 
the actual event being reported, and direct perception of the subsequent state which 
directly resulted from that event. (DeLancey 1985: 67).
DeLancey correctly describes the semantics of V-bźag and V-soṅ, but because he con-
trasts two past tense forms (V-pa-red and V-soṅ) with a perfect tense form (V-bźag), 
he interprets a tense distinction as an evidential distinction. His account is only pos-
sible because he conflates the past and perfect tenses, ignoring several terms of the 
verbal paradigm, in particular V-yod-pa-red, the perfect equivalent of V-pa-red. 
DeLancey overlooks many publications that treat V-bźag as a perfect. 
According to Sandberg V-pa-yin and V-pa-red reflect “what the French would 
style the Past Indefinite” whereas V-yod and V-ḥdug are an “expression of the 
perfect tense active” (1894: 53). Goldstein and Nornang classify V-yod, V-yod-pa-
red, and V-bźag as ‘present perfect’, distinct from V-pa-yin, V-pa-red, and V-soṅ, 
which they label ‘past’ (1970: 408). Yukawa clearly identifies V-bźag as a perfect 
experiential. 
完了動詞にduuがつくと、その行為がおこったことが現在目前のことがらから歴然とし
ていることもあらわす。つまり, 何らかの感覚で感じられるわけである。なお, 肯定形
はšaaを用いる。
When it comes to ḥdug in the perfect, it describes the fact that evidence of the action that 
occurred is now before the eyes, i.e. that one experiences a sensation in some way. For the 
unnegated form bźag is used. (Yukawa 1971: 190)
Yukawa also describes V-yod and V-yod-pa-red as having perfect semantics 
(1971: 189/190). Kitamura describes V-pa-yin, V-pa-red, and V-soṅ as ‘past’ (1977: 
31/32) and V-yod, V-yo-pa-red, and V-bźag as ‘present perfect’ (1977: 33). Chang 
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and Chang identify V-yod, V-yo-pa-red, and V-bźag as the ‘present perfect’ (1984: 
620–622); they describe -bźag as having the semantics of “first-hand experience” 
(Chang and Chang 1984: 621). Hoshi describes V-pa-yin, V-pa-red, and V-soṅ as 
‘completed non-durative’ (完了-非継続相) and V-yod, V-yod-pa-red, and V-bźag 
as ‘completed durative’ (完了-継続相) (1988: 187/188).11 Tournadre also clearly 
distinguishes V-pa-yin, V-pa-red and V-soṅ as ‘aorist’ and V-yod, V-yod-pa-red, 
and V-bźag as ‘perfect’ (1996: 245). Denwood likewise distinguishes V-pa-yin, 
V-pa-red and V-soṅ as ‘past’ (1999: 142–149) and V-yod, V-yod-pa-red, and V-bźag 
as ‘perfect’ (1999: 158–161). Volkart (2000) points out that an inferential meaning 
of a perfect experiential is found not only in ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan, but in a number 
of Central Tibetan dialects. Apparently unaware of this tradition of scholarship, 
in his most recent discussion of V-bźag, DeLancey essentially repeats his 1985 
11 I see ‘completed durative’ (完了-継続相) as equivalent to Comrie’s “continuing present rel-
evance of a past situation” (1976: 53), i.e. the textbook definition of ‘perfect’, but the reader may 
note that Hoshi uses the term 完了, normally identified with English ‘perfect’, in her terminology 
both for the past (V-pa-yin, V-pa-red and V-soṅ) and the perfect (V-yod, V-yod-pa-red, and V-bźag). 
Tab. 3: ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan copula system (top) and verbal conjugation (bottom) according  
to Tournadre and Dorje (2009: 410).
Existential 
copula
Essential 
copula
Personal yod yin
Factual yod-pa-red red
Testimonial ḥdug ---
Revelatory --- red-bźag
Future Present Past Perfect
Personal V-gi-yin V-gi-yod V-pa-yin V-yod
Factual V-gi-red V-gi-yod-pa-red V-pa-red V-yod-pa-red
Testimonial  --- V-gi-ḥdug V-soṅ ---
Inferential --- --- --- V-bźag
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discussion;12 he continues to ignore V-yod, and V-yod-pa-red and fails to recog-
nize the perfect and past as separate tenses (2003: 227/228).13
Just as the semantics of the experiential “is an inevitable consequence of its 
position in a paradigm where it contrasts with other epistemic categories, the 
personal and generic” (DeLancey 2012: 554), so too the semantics of the ‘Lhasa’ 
Tibetan perfect tense is an inevitable consequence of its position in a paradigm 
where it contrasts with the future, present, and past. Returning to DeLancey’s 
examples about hanging up Thangkas, if verb tense is held constant, the three 
evidential categories contrast in the past with the triplet of examples (15), (16), 
and (17) or in the perfect with the triplet of examples (18), (19), and (20).
Past
(15) ṅas thaṅ-kha bkal-pa-yin
me-erg Thangka hang-pst:prs
‘I hung up a Thangka’ (I know; I did it)
12 DeLancey does change other elements of his analysis of the ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan verbal system, for 
example introducing the terminology ‘conjunct-disjunct’ (2003: 278–280). These changes draw 
his analysis further out of step with other researchers on Tibetan (cf. Tournadre 2008).
13 As recently as 2012 DeLancey appears to regard ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan as having a separate ‘infer-
ential’ category (2012: 536). Although he does not mention V-bźag or explicitly posit any other 
inferential marker in ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan, he does comment that “the immediate category contrasts 
with the personal and inferential categories” (DeLancey 2012: 554). 
Tab. 4: Re-presentation of ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan verbal system emphasizing morphological links 
among revelatory, inferential and testimonial.
Existential 
copula
Essential 
copula
Personal yod yin
Factual yod-pa-red red
Testimonial ḥdug ---
Revelatory --- (red-ḥdug)
Future Present Past Perfect
Personal V-gi-yin V-gi-yod V-pa-yin V-yod
Factual V-gi-red V-gi-yod-pa-red V-pa-red V-yod-pa-red
Testimonial --- V-gi-ḥdug V-soṅ ---
Inferential --- --- --- (V-ḥdug)
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(16) bsod-nams-kyis thaṅ-kha bkal-pa-red
Sonam-erg Thangka hang-pst:fac
‘Sonam hung up a Thangka’ (I know; people know)
(17) bsod-nams-kyis thaṅ-kha bkal-soṅ
Sonam-erg Thangka hang-pst:exp
‘Sonam hung up a Thangka’ (I know; I saw)
Perfect
(18) ṅas thaṅ-kha bkal-yod
me-erg Thangka hang-prf:prs
‘I have hung up a Thangka.’ (I know; I did it)
(19) bsod-nams-kyis thaṅ-kha bkal-yod-pa-red
Sonam-erg Thangka hang-prf:fac
‘Sonam has hung up a Thangka’ (I know; people know)
(20) bsod-nams-kyis thaṅ-kha bkal-bźag
Sonam-erg Thangka hang-prf:exp
‘Sonam has hung up a Thangka’ (I know; I saw)
If one distinguishes the past and perfect tenses, the apparent contrast between a 
‘direct’ V-soṅ and an ‘inferred’ V-bźag disappears. Instead, both V-soṅ and V-bźag 
encode witnessed evidentiality and the difference in their semantics is the diffe-
rent between the past and the perfect. 
5.2.5.2 Tournadre and Dorje’s analysis of Tibetan V-bźag
Tournadre and Dorje posit five evidential categories in their analysis of the 
‘Lhasa’ Tibetan verbal system: personal, factual, testimonial, revelatory, and 
inferential (2009: 140–144, 410, 413). Table 3 summarizes their presentation of 
the verbal system.14 In this analysis three evidential categories, testimonial, 
revelatory, and inferential, are in complementary distribution. The testimonial 
occurs as an existential copula and as a suffix of the past and present. The reve-
latory and the inferential are also in complementary distribution: the revelatory 
occurs only as an essential copula and the inferential occurs only as a perfect 
verb ending. In contrast, the personal and assertative occur as existential copula, 
14 In an inconsequential terminological adjustment to agree with the overall usage here, I 
change ‘egophoric’ to ‘personal’. ‘Egophoric’ is an unattractive neologism and implies some spe-
cial relationship with the first person (ego), but all Tibetan evidentials can occur with any of the 
grammatical persons (Hill 2013b).
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essential copula, and as suffixes of the present, past, perfect, and future. From 
a methodological perspective, if two categories are in complementary distribu-
tion it is possible to unite them as a single category (Harris 1951: 303–309). Until 
Tournadre and Dorje make explicit their reasoning for separating the inferen-
tial and relevatory from the testimonial, the distribution of the relevant forms 
compels their unification.
In addition to improving the overall elegance of the analysis, there are mor-
phological reasons for combining the testimonial, revelatory, and inferential. 
As seen in Tab. 3, the revelatory essential copula red-bźag shares the compo-
nent ‘bźag’ with the inferential perfect ending V-bźag. This formal similarity 
suggests a special relationship between the revelatory and the inferential. 
Tournadre and Dorje’s inferential and relevatory evidential categories also bear 
formal links with the testimonial, which Tab. 3 fails to capture. The interroga-
tive form of red-bźag is red-ḥdug, and it is negated as red-mi-ḥdug (cf. Tournadre 
and Dorje 2009: 411). An alternative form of the perfect inferential is V-ḥdug, 
and V-bźag itself is negated as V-mi-ḥdug (Kitamura 1977: 33; Chang and Chang 
1984: 620; Hoshi 1988: 286–291; Tournadre and Dorje 2009: 140).15 If one pre-
sents the ‘Lhasa’ verbal system in tabular form again, emphasizing these formal 
ties among the revelatory, inferential, and testimonial (cf. Tab. 4), the desirabi-
lity of uniting all three together as a single category is readily apparent. Amen-
ding Tournadre and Dorje’s analysis to account for these distributions results 
in Tab. 2 above.16
5.2.5.3 Tibetan V-bźag is a perfect experiential
Having considered in turn the arguments of DeLancey and Tournadre and Dorje that 
V-bźag is an inferential marker, it is convenient to summarize the case that V-bźag 
is a perfect experiential. DeLancey arrives at his analysis by omitting several com-
ponents of the Tibetan verbal paradigm. For Tournadre and Dorje the inferential is 
in complementary distribution with the testimonial and revelatory. Taken together 
the testimonial, inferential, and revelatory are used in the same morpho-syntactic 
environments as the personal and factual evidential categories. Consequently, 
15 Tournadre (1996: 245) and Denwood (1999: 159–160) distinguish V-bźag and V-ḥdug as having 
somewhat separate meanings. However, as seen, Yukawa (1971: 190), Chang and Chang (1984: 
620), and Tournadre and Dorje (2009: 140, 411) reject such a distinction. Given the discussion in 
Volkart (2000) and Denwood (1999: 159) it seems likely that V-bźag is the form used in the city of 
Lhasa itself whereas V-ḥdug is current in other parts of Central Tibet (cf. Note 9).
16 Tournadre and LaPolla (2014: 241) refer to ḥdug as ‘sensory’ and red-bźag as ‘sensory (inferential)’ 
this choice of terminology implies that Tournadre now agrees with the analysis proposed here. 
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structuralist methodology leads to the inevitable conclusion that it is a mistake 
to distinguish the inferential and revelatory from the testimonial. The morpho-
logical content of the forms in question further buttresses this conclusion; the 
morpheme ḥdug appears in all three. These considerations all weigh in favour 
of positing only three evidential categories for ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan, viz. personal, 
factual, and testimonial. More specifically, the suffix V-bźag patterns paradig-
matically like a perfect testimonial, it has morphological links with the testimo-
nial (via V-ḥdug and V-mi-ḥdug), and its inferential meaning precisely sums the 
semantics of the testimonial and the perfect; V-bźag is a perfect experiential with 
a derived use to express inferences. 
5.3 Newly proposed examples of the perfect experiential
The perfect experiential constructions in Sherpa, Duna, Oksapmin, Bogaia, and 
‘Lhasa’ Tibetan, by undermining confidence in the iron-clad boundary between 
direct perception and inference, inspire an open-mindedness that construc-
tions hitherto described in some other fashion may also permit analysis as 
perfect experientials. The morphemes oleo in Kham and -qa in Kashaya present 
such cases.
5.3.1 Kham
Watters describes oleo in Kham not as a visual evidential but as a mirative marker 
(2002: 288–296). Nonetheless, equipped with knowledge of the perfect experien-
tial in other languages, it is possible to resolve those objections that DeLancey 
(2012: 535–538) and Hengeveld and Olbertz (2012: 495/496) raise to my (Hill 2012: 
420/421) analysis of oleo as a visual evidential.
Hengeveld and Olbertz draw attention to examples (21) and (22) in Kham 
(2012: 495), which Watters (2002: 292) analyzes as showing mirativity,17 but which 
I understand as consistent with an analysis in terms of sense evidence (Hill 2012: 
421). According to Hengeveld and Olbertz (2012: 495/496) example (21) “is clearly 
a case of direct perception” and example (22) is “a case of inference” (Hengeveld 
and Olbertz 2012: 495).
17 Hengeveld and Olbertz agree with Watters that these examples merit the moniker ‘mirative’ 
(2012: 495), but they redefine what is meant by this label (2012: 498 et passim); i.e. they disagree 
with DeLancey and Watters about the grammatical meaning that oleo in Kham exhibits.
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(21) mənlal-lai tə “e babəi mənlal
Manlal-obj foc hey man Manlal
nə-kə zə ci syã:-də u-li-zya-o oleo sani”
dist-at emp cep sleep-nf 3S-be-cont:nml mir confirm
(I said) to Manlal, “Hey man, Manlala, he’s right there sleeping, see!”
(22) ŋa-khurja ŋa-sə-məi-wo oleo
my-knife 1S-caus-lose-nml mir
‘I lost my knife!’ (I just discovered it)
 (Watters 2002: 292 example 19)18
These two sentences share a common morphological element and a common 
semantic element. The common morphological element is the oleo construction. 
The common semantic component is direct perception. There is also a morpholo-
gical and a semantic difference between the two sentences. Example (21) includes 
the marker of continuous aspect -zya (Watters 2002: 89) and refers to present time. 
In contrast, since “the default aspect for this paradigm is the perfective, which is 
unmarked” (Watters 2002: 89) the lack of -zya in example (22) indicates perfec-
tive aspect and the sentence refers to past time.19 The inferential reading in Kham 
emerges as an interaction of direct evidence with certain tense or aspect categories. 
In his argument against oleo as a marker of direct evidence, DeLancey con-
trasts example (21) with example (23). For DeLancey example (21) is used “when 
the information being related is perceived at first hand” and example (23) a 
statement “based on inference [...] said when the speaker first discovered traces 
showing that the leopard had eaten his dog” (DeLancey 2012: 536).
(23) a-kə  zə o-kəi-wo oleo
 here-at emp 3sg-eat-nml mir
‘He ate [him] right here!’
(DeLancey 2012: 536, cf. Watters 2002: 291)
DeLancey rightly surmises that I see no obstacle to analyzing (23) as visual evi-
dence “because, after all, the speaker did see something” (DeLancey 2012: 536 
18 There is an ambiguity in Watters translation as to whether the knife or the fact of loss is the 
antecedent of ‘it’.
19 The reader may object that ‘perfective aspect’ (with reference to past time) is not a ‘perfect’, 
so oleo used with perfective aspect cannot be a ‘perfect testimonial’. This objections places too 
much significance on Watter’s terminological choices. Example (22) is indubitably an instance of 
“continuing present relevance of a past situation” (Comrie 1976: 53). Thus, oleo used with a verb 
unmarked for aspect jointly express perfect semantics, even if Kham has no morphosyntactic 
category for which ‘the perfect’ is a tempting label.
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emphasis in original). The same aspectual contrast observed between examples 
(21) and (22) also obtains between (21) and (23); consequently, the same explana-
tion is available. Example (23), where the speaker infers that a leopard has eaten 
a dog and expresses this inference with oleo in the perfective aspect, is parallel to 
example (1), where the speaker infers that a dog has eaten Easter chocolates and 
expresses this inference with ‘see’ in the English present perfect. 
In the Kham examples (22) and (23) the direct perception is not the perception 
of an action or a presence, but of an absence. As DeLancey puts it, “the speaker is 
a direct witness to the proposition he states in (5) [= 21], and is explicitly not in (6) 
[=(23)]” (2012: 536). Whether or not witness of absence, of nothingness, is indeed 
direct perception is a philosophical question, and we “must leave to philosophers 
the task of clarifying the status of semantic, i.e. conceptual categories considered 
independently of their linguistic embodiment” (Lazard 1999: 105); in language 
such things happen. The Classical Tibetan example (24), in which two brothers 
discover that their younger brother has been eaten by a tiger, is narratively close 
to the Kham example (23). Just as in the Kham example the dog owner did not 
witness the leopard consuming his dog, in the Tibetan example the two brothers 
did not witness the eating of their sibling but only its after effects, nonetheless 
the passage uses the direct evidential marker ḥdug, which DeLancey himself now 
analyses in ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan as an ‘immediate evidential’ (2012: 554).20
(24) bltas-pa-na / nu-bo tha-chuṅ stag-gis zos-te / śa-daṅ
look-nmz:cv younger.brother younger tiger-agn eat-cv flesh-ass
khrag-gis kun-tu bsgos nas/ rtsog-rtsog ltar
blood-agn everywhere-trm stain-cv filth like-trm
ḥdug-par mthoṅ-nas
is-tes:nmz:trm see-cv
‘When they looked (his older brothers) saw, that the younger brother had 
been eaten by a tiger, that everywhere was filthily stained with flesh and 
blood’
(Hahn 1996: 191, my translation)
Tuyuca is yet another language in which the visual witness of absence is a valid 
means to express an inferred act of feline violence. In a situation very close to 
the leopard slaying a dog in Kham, or the tiger eating a young prince in Tibetan, 
20 DeLancey claims that in Classical Tibetan ḥdug is not an evidential marker but instead a verb 
‘sit’ (1992: 52). It is unclear how he would analyze ḥdug in example (24). For further discussion of 
testimonial evidentiality in Classical Tibetan see Hill (2013a).
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in Tuyuca one can relate the inferred slaying of a dog by a jaguar with a visual 
evidential. 
On one occasion a man returned from his field and, using a visual evidential, told me that a 
jaguar had killed his dog. In astonishment, I asked him if he had seen the event. He said that 
he had not […] he saw marks on the ground where the jaguar had dragged him off. (Barnes 
1984: 263 emphasis in original). 
Unfortunately Barnes does not provide the original sentence that the man said to her. 
Putting aside the predatory activities of big cats, the use of negated direct 
evidentials shows that seeing an absence is still seeing. In the ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan 
example (25) the speaker sees the absence of shelves. 
(25) thab ḥdiḥi steṅ-la ña skam-paḥi phyir-du
hearth this-gen above-obl fish dry-gen in.order-to
grab      mi-ḥdug
method  not-exist-exp
‘There are no shelves over the fire for the drying of fish.’
(Lewin 1879: 71, exercise 61, example 6)
In English it is also possible to see absences, as examples (26) and (27) show.
(26) But the second my eyes cleared floor level I saw that the relics had gone! (BNC)
(27)  I see that y you weren’t there at that meeting on … (Looking at the minutes 
of a previous meeting) (BNC)
If the experiential in Tibetan, the visual evidential in Tuyuca, and the verb ‘see’ in 
English can encode the visual witness of absence, there is no reason a priori that 
this possibility should escape oleo in Kham. 
DeLancey offers no evidence for his claim that “in a true evidential language” 
examples (21) and (23) “in the context in which they were made, could not be in 
the same grammatical form” (2012: 536). If his view is accurate than the possi-
bility remains open that like English, neither Tibetan, Tuyucan, nor Kham are 
‘true’ evidential languages. In the absence of a discussion of how a ‘true eviden-
tial language’ differs from other types of evidential languages, an effort to ponder 
DeLancey’s intention would drift into speculation (cf. §1.1 above).
DeLancey’s contention that the ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan equivalents of (21) and (23) 
would be effected in two distinct evidential categories, respectively the ‘direct evi-
dential’ and ‘inferential’ (2012: 536), is only true if one follows his analysis of the 
Tibetan verbal system, rejected above (§2.5.1). Examples (28) and (29) provide trans-
lation into ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan of the Kham examples (21) and (23); contra DeLancey 
these two sentences use the same experiential evidential category, the difference 
between V-gi-ḥdug and V-bźag being one of tense and not evidence (cf. §2.5). 
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(28) gzigs pha-gir gñal-gyi-ḥdug
leopard there-obl sleep-prs-test
‘The leopard is sleeping over there’
(29) ḥdir kho bzas-bźag
 here-obl he eat-prf-test
‘(The leopard must have) eaten him right here’
(cf. example 24 for an analogous example in Classical Tibetan also in the 
experiential)
In sum, Watters does not provide evidence sufficient to preclude the analysis of 
oleo as a direct evidential; until such evidence is in hand the conclusion that oleo 
marks the ‘mirative’ is premature and oleo should not serve as the prime example 
of “mirativity as a separate category” (Aikhenvald 2004: 211).21 Whatever future 
research on Kham may yield, those who do fieldwork on this language would do 
well to not enter upon their work with the preconception that direct evidence 
and inference are irreconcilably opposed. The published examples of oleo admit 
themselves to analysis as direct evidentials.
5.3.2 Kashaya
Oswalt (1961, 1986) describes Kashaya as a language that has eight evidential 
categories in the ‘spontaneous’ tense. He distinguishes two types of inferential 
evidentials: ‘inferential I’ the suffix -qa and ‘inferential II’ the suffix -bi. In his 
1961 contribution Oswalt draws both syntactic and semantic distinctions between 
these two suffixes (1961: 243/244), but in his 1986 contribution he presents them 
as semantically identical but distinct in distribution, with -qa occurring in main 
clauses and -bi occurring only in subordinate clauses. 
Oswalt’s description of inferential suffixes in Kashaya is equivocal and metho-
dologically unsatisfactory. After reporting that -bi occurs predominantly in subor-
dinate clauses (1986: 41), he discusses -bi-w “where -w is probably the Absolutive” 
as the “most common nonsubordinating combination” (1986: 42). Thus, Oswalt 
is unsure of whether -w is the Absolutive and there are other non-subordinating 
21 Examples of oleo in Kham constitute four of the seven examples that Aikhenvald uses to 
illustrate ‘mirativity as a separate category’ (2004: 211–214). As for the one example of =(a)m 
given from Cupeño, Aikhenvald more recently admits there “is unfortunately no way the exact 
status of =(a)m can be ascertained” (2012: 467). Her remaining two examples are from Tariana 
(cf. Hill 2012: 425–426).
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combinations into which -bi enters, which he refrains from enumerating. One non-
subordinating combinations into which -bi enters is -bi-qa; “no difference has been 
determined for the meaning of this form versus either suffix separately” (1986: 42). 
In gross violation of the ‘one form one meaning’ principle, the speaker of Kayasha 
is burdened with three equivalent ways of expressing inference in finite clauses: 
bi-w, -qa, and -bi-qa; it must be a difficult language to master. 
Based on Oswalt’s account, de Haan unites -qa and -bi as one inferential cate-
gory in his discussion of Kashaya evidentiality (2001: 198). This unification is not 
justifiable. Such a unification would be possible only if the two suffixes together 
patterned similarly to other evidential suffixes. Since the suffix -bi is mostly 
restricted to subordinate clauses, if -qa were precluded from subordinate clauses, 
then together the two evidentials would pattern like other evidential categories 
such as visual -ya, which occurs in both finite and subordinate clauses. However, 
because Oswalt does not preclude the use of -qa in subordinate clauses, such a 
unification is not permissible.
Perhaps it is premature to use Kashaya at all in typological discussions of 
evidentiality until its structural description is more precisely formulated. I 
nonetheless indulge in a few remarks on the basis of Oswalt’s examples. Almost 
all examples of ‘Inferential I’ have English translations with a present perfect and 
the context normally requires visual evidence (examples (30)–(33)). 
(30) mu cohtocʰqʰ
mu cohtoc-qa
 he leave-infer.i
‘He has left’ (Said on discovering that the person is no longer present)
(Oswalt 1986: 38)
(31) ˀahqʰa pʰímaqam=ṭ′o
 river they-must-have-gone-across
‘They must have gone across the river’ (This was judged from the tracks)
 (Oswalt 1961: 244)22
(32) kalikakʰ dima: s′i -qa-c′-qʰ
 book holding make-cause-self-infer.i
‘He has had a picture taken of himself holding a book’
(Oswalt 1986: 39)
22 Oswalt does not segment the verb form pʰímaqam but underlines the ‘q’ to note it as the 
inferential-I form (1961: 244).
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(33) sinamqh
 drown-infer.i
‘He must have drowned’ 
(Oswalt 1961: 243)
(34) sapa·tu míṭónṭolowa·du tala·qʰ
 shoes that-are-rubbing-sore-on-his-toes he-must-be-wearing
‘He must be wearing shoes that are rubbing sore spots on his toes’  
(This was deduced form the person’s manner of walking in new shoes)
(Oswalt 1961: 244)
In examples (30) and (31) the translation makes the visual nature of the evidence 
explicit. In example (32) the evidence is “the existence of the picture, which the 
speaker has seen” (de Haan 2001: 200). Example (33) is said when “the speaker 
saw the body cast up on a beach or floating in the water” (Oswalt 1961: 243). 
Example (34) does not have an English present perfect in the translation, but 
does make the source of visual evidence explicit.
According to Oswalt qa- marks evidence from senses other than vision and 
hearing “to a certain extent” (1986: 38); he offers example (35) as evidence.
(35) cuhni: muʔt‘a-qʰ
 bread cook-infer.i
‘[I smell that] bread has been cooked’.
(Oswalt 1986: 38).
However, it is noteworthy that example (35) also employs the present perfect tense 
in the English translation. If ‘Inference-I’ is used for smell, taste, and touch in 
general, then one ought to be able to say ‘I smell that the vegetables are cooking’ 
using this evidential. In the absence of an example of ‘Inference-I’ used in habi-
tual or imperfective contexts, nothing in Oswalt’s description precludes the con-
clusion that -qa is a morpheme that encodes the overlap between sense evidence 
and perfect tense, another example of the perfect experiential.
5.4 Conclusion
With due allowance for the anthropomorphism this study concurs with de Haan 
that languages “can choose how they wish to treat the inferential evidential” 
(2001: 194). Willett, Aikhenvald, DeLancey, and Hengeveld and Olbertz are mis-
taken in their belief that “direct vs. indirect evidence is the fundamental evidential 
distinction” (DeLancey 2012: 540), as the perfect experiential in Sherpa, Duna, 
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Oksapmin, Bogaia, and ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan shows. Disabused of this misconcep-
tion it is possible not only to dismiss the objections of DeLancey (2012) and Hen-
geveld and Olbertz (2012) to the analysis of oleo in Kham as a direct evidential, 
but to potentially describe -qa in Kashaya as yet another perfect experiential. 
Apart from these six perfect experientials, Foe, Maricopa, Hualapai, and Matses 
reveal other types of interaction between direct evidence and inference. 
Abbreviations
1s first singular, 3s third singular, ass associative, aux auxiliary verb, bnc British 
National Corpus, caus causative, cep counter-expectation particle, confirm con-
firmative, cont continuous aspect, cv converb, dep dependent, emp emphatic, 
emph emphatic, erg ergative, evid evidential marker, fac factual, foc focus, fp 
far past, he habitual evidential, hes hesitation, infer-i inferential evidential 1, 
ipfv imperfective, link prosodic linker, nf non-final marker, nml nominalizer, 
nmz nominalizer, mir mirative, o object, obj objective, p previous evidence, 
past past, per personal-factual evidential in Oksapmin or personal in Tibetan, 
pfv perfective, pi past inferential, pl plural, prf perfect, prs present, prx pro-
ximal, psn personal name, quot quote, rep reported evidential, seq sequential, 
sim simultaneous, ss same- subject/reference marker, stat stative, subj subject 
marker, sw switch, exp experiential, trm terminative, todp today past, vis visual 
evidence, yestp yesterday past.
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